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Background and aims: Although numerous correlational studies have shown an association between cognitive
distortions and problem gambling, only a few behavioral studies have investigated this topic by comparing problem
(PGs) and non-problem gamblers (N-PGs). This quasi-experiment investigated the occurrence in both groups of a
widespread cognitive distortion, the gambler’s fallacy (GF), using a ﬁctitious roulette game. Moreover, it investigated
whether the GF increased the bet amount and whether impulsivity and sensation seeking were associated with the GF.
Methods: Two indices of the GF were used: a cognitive index, the probability estimate of each outcome (black/red)
after manipulating the ﬁnal run length (the same outcome occurring four times/once), and a behavioral index, the
choice of the outcome on which to bet. A total of 320 (160 PGs and 160 N-PGs) unpaid male volunteers, aged
between 18 and 68, participated in this study. Hypotheses: Erroneous probability estimates should mediate the effect
of longer runs on the alternation choice (i.e., the choice of an outcome different from the previous one) to support the
occurrence of GF. The GF should increase betting. PGs should be more prone than N-PGs to GF. Results: The choice
of the outcome depended on both cognitive (erroneous probability estimates) and affective (preference for red)
factors. PGs bet more than N-PGs but they were not more prone than N-PGs to incurring GF. Although impulsivity
and sensation seeking were more intense in PGs than in N-PGs, they scarcely affected GF. Discussion and
conclusions: Overall, our results corroborate the tested model of the GF that links mistaken probability estimates,
choice of the outcome on which to bet, and bet amount. However, they are similar to PGs and N-PGs and fail to
corroborate the hypothesis that the GF is more evident in PGs.
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INTRODUCTION
The cognitive approach to problem or pathological gam-
bling [Even if the name Pathological Gambling used in
DSM-IV (1994) has been changed to Gambling Disorder in
DSM-5 (2013), we think that the large category of “problem
gambling” we have used in the text is compatible with the
DSM-5 deﬁnition of Gambling Disorder as “Persistent and
recurrent problematic gambling behavior leading to clini-
cally signiﬁcant impairment or distress [....]”] posits a
strong association between the development and mainte-
nance of this behavior and gambling-related cognitive dis-
tortions, such as an incorrect perception of randomness
and erroneous probability estimates (Clark, 2010; Goodie
& Fortune, 2013; Goodie, Fortune, & Shotwell, 2019;
Ladouceur & Walker, 1996). Although the literature about
judgment and decision-making has demonstrated that
human beings are generally prone to cognitive distortions
when making decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), several studies have found
that, compared to non-problem gamblers (N-PGs), problem
gamblers (PGs) are more likely to incur cognitive biases
(Barrault & Varescon, 2013; Ciccarelli, Grifﬁths, Nigro, &
Cosenza, 2017; Cosenza & Nigro, 2015; Cunningham,
Hodgins, & Toneatto, 2014; Fortune & Goodie, 2012;
Joukhador, MacCallum, & Blaszczynski, 2003; Lambos
& Delfabbro, 2007; Mathieu, Barrault, Brunault, &
Varescon, 2018; Navas, Verdejo-Garcia, Lopez-Gomez,
Maldonado, & Perales, 2016; Romo et al., 2016; Toneatto,
Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997;
Toneatto & Millar, 2004; Wohl, Young, & Hart, 2007).
Actually, such a conclusion stems from studies using mostly
self-report instruments, such as the Gambling Attitudes and
Beliefs Survey (Breen & Zuckerman, 1999), the Gambling
Belief Questionnaires 1 (Steenbergh, Meyers, May, &
Whelan, 2002) and 2 (Joukhador et al., 2003) or the
Gambling-Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS; Raylu & Oei,
2004). Overall, the results showed that PGs tend to score
higher than N-PGs, and/or that higher scores on these
measures correlate with increasing PG severity (for a
review, see Goodie & Fortune, 2013). However, a quite
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recent review (Leonard, Williams, & Vokey, 2015; see also
Goodie et al., 2019) highlighted that the comprehensive
measure instruments are generally based on an overly exten-
sive conception of cognitive distortions, such that they
conjunctly assess behavioral, motivational, emotional, and
cognitive gambling-related factors. In this way, content
validity may be undermined. Moreover, behavioral or exper-
imental studies comparing PGs and N-PGs are lacking or
very few (e.g., Dixon, Wilson, & Habib, 2014; Gaissmaier
et al., 2016; Marmurek, Switzer, & D’Alvise, 2015).
Similar considerations can also be made for the line of
research investigating the relationship between personality
factors – in particular, impulsivity and sensation seeking –
cognitive distortions and PG. Several studies (e.g., Chiu &
Storm, 2010; Ledgerwood, Alessi, Phoenix, & Petry, 2009)
have found higher levels of impulsivity in PGs compared
with N-PGs, whereas the results about sensation seeking are
heterogeneous (e.g., Bonnaire, Bungener, & Varescon, 2017;
Gupta, Derevensky, & Ellenbogen, 2006; Parke, Grifﬁths, &
Irwing, 2004; for a review, see MacLaren, Fugelsang,
Harrigan, & Dixon, 2011). However, an increasing number
of authors (e.g., Cyders & Smith, 2008; Megías et al., 2018;
Sharma, Markon, & Clark, 2014) tend to consider impul-
sivity as a multidimensional construct encompassing
sensation seeking and associated with several problematic
behaviors, including compulsive gambling (see the meta-
analysis of Sharma et al., 2014). Finally, other studies
(Gaissmaier et al., 2016; Michalczuk, Bowden-Jones,
Verdejo-Garcia, & Clark, 2011) have found an association
between impulsivity and gambling distortions in PGs and
have shown that both constructs are signiﬁcant predictors
of gambling severity. In this study, we have considered
impulsivity and sensation seeking as two similar but
separate constructs and thus have used two different
measures to assess them.
This study investigates the putative differences between
PGs and N-PGs in their proneness to the gambler’s fallacy
(GF), one of the most robust and well-known gambling-
related cognitive distortions (see Laplace, 1814 for its ﬁrst
description). Speciﬁcally, the GF is the mistaken belief that
a random binary sequence (e.g., heads or tails in a “ﬂip of a
coin”) exhibiting the same outcome consecutively will be
interrupted by the opposite outcome (negative recency),
without considering the mutual independence of random
events. The classical explication of this phenomenon refers
to the law of small numbers (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971)
and the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky,
1972; Rabin, 2002). According to these assumptions, people
tend to believe that a random sequence has the same features
not only globally but also locally. Therefore, a short random
sequence should be analogous to (i.e., representative of)
longer random sequences. Therefore, since a run of identical
outcomes is not representative of naive conceptions of
randomness (postulating quite a balanced alternation of
opposite events; Wagenaar, 1972), people tend to conclude
that an opposite outcome will occur in the future to balance
the sequence.
Empirical evidence for the GF mainly comes from
experimental or behavioral studies investigating its
occurrence in N-PGs rather than in PGs (e.g., Ayton &
Fischer, 2004; Boynton, 2003; Braga, Ferreira, & Sherman,
2013; Burns & Corpus, 2004; Lyons, Weeks, & Elliott,
2013; Navarrete & Santamaria, 2012; Roney & Trick, 2003;
Studer, Limbrick-Oldﬁeld, & Clark, 2015; Xue et al., 2012)
or from ﬁeld studies on casinos (Croson & Sundali, 2005;
Sundali & Croson, 2006), lotteries (Clotfelter & Cook,
1991; Suetens, Galbo-Jørgensen, & Tyran, 2016), horse
races (Terrell, 1994), or population samples (Dohmen,
Falk, Huffman, Marklein, & Sunde, 2009; Doidge, Feng,
& Hennessy, 2019), which did not distinguish between the
two groups. Finally, a few studies (e.g., Clark, Studer,
Bruss, Tranel, & Bechara, 2014) have investigated neural
regions underlying gambling-related cognitive distortions,
such as GF and near-miss, in both patients with focal brain
lesions and healthy individuals.
Overall, these studies employed the “what’s next?”
paradigm (Oskarsson, Boven, Mcclelland, & Hastie,
2009), in which participants predict (and/or bet on) the
next outcome after a sequence of binary outcomes of
different length, and sometimes indicate their conﬁdence
degree in their prediction or specify the bet amount. In
such a paradigm, the probability overestimation of the
predicted outcome is implicitly assumed. Only a few
studies (Burns & Corpus, 2004; Caruso, Waytz, & Epley,
2010; Dohmen et al., 2009; Matarazzo, Carpentieri,
Greco, & Pizzini, 2017; Navarrete & Santamaria, 2012)
used a procedure where participants had to indicate, in
addition to the outcome prediction, the explicit probabili-
ty estimate of the next outcome.
Generally, these studies documented people’s proneness
to GF, and those also investigating betting behavior
found that GF was associated with a higher bet amount
(e.g., Clotfelter & Cook, 1991; Croson & Sundali, 2005;
Roney & Trick, 2003; Studer et al., 2015; Suetens et al.,
2016; Terrell, 1994).
Concerning the difference between PGs and N-PGs in
their proneness to GF, we have already said that the occur-
rence of this fallacy has been mainly assessed through
correlational studies using self-report instruments aimed at
examining a wide range of cognitive distortions. From the
meta-analyses conducted by Goodie and Fortune (2013), it
emerged that GF was “consistently” associated with a robust
effect size with PG. A more recent study by Donati et al.
(2018) assessed the probability to fall into the GF by means
of a speciﬁc task, and found that higher susceptibility to the
GF and higher superstitious thinking fuel PG in male
adolescents through the mediation of other cognitive dis-
tortions. Opposite results emerged from the study of
Marmurek et al. (2015), in which GF was experimentally
tested in the frame of a larger investigation on the relation-
ship between impulsivity and gambling cognitions in PG
and N-PG undergraduates. A behavioral measure of GF
was obtained through a game with a simulated two-color
roulette wheel by computing the number of bets on the
color opposite to the previous one in different-length
series of consecutive identical outcomes. PGs and N-PGs
scored differently on GRCS and on the Impulsivity scale
(Cyders et al., 2007), but did not differ in terms of GF.
Previously, Lambos and Delfabbro (2007), in a study
assessing irrational beliefs and numerical reasoning ability
in occasional, regular, and pathological poker machine
players, found that although pathological gamblers were
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more susceptible to endorsing all examined cognitive biases
than the other two groups, they were not less accurate than
the other groups in understanding basic gambling odds or in
numerical reasoning.
This study aims to investigate GF in PGs and N-PGs
more deeply through a ﬁctitious roulette game and clarify
whether impulsivity and sensation seeking are associated
with the putative occurrence of GF. We used two indices
for GF: a behavioral index, i.e., the choice of betting on an
outcome opposite to the last one in a series of identical
outcomes, and a cognitive index, i.e., the overestimation
of its probability. In such a way, we tested whether the
choice would depend on the cognitive process of proba-
bility evaluation, or on a simpler affective process, such as
the preference for one speciﬁc color rather than the other,
in line with a similar ﬁnding that emerged in the study of
Matarazzo et al. (2017) on N-PGs. In addition, we aimed
at investigating whether GF increased the bet amount. If
GF depends on an erroneous probability estimate and
if this false belief fuels betting, then overestimating the
probability of an alternative outcome, choosing to bet on
it, and increasing the bet amount should be causally
related. Note that such assumptions underline the hypoth-
esis that a cognitive distortion like the GF is responsible
for the genesis and the maintenance of PG. Consequently,
according to this hypothesis, the aforementioned paths
should be more prominent in PGs than in N-PGs. More-
over, we should ﬁnd a more pronounced association
between impulsivity, sensation seeking, and GF in PGs
than in N-PGs.
METHODS
Design
The study had a 2 × 2 × 2 design, with three between-
subject variables. Two variables were manipulated in a
ﬁctitious American roulette game, with the wheel having
only two colors (red and black): run length, indicating how
many times the same color occurred in the ﬁnal part of the
run (4 times vs. 1 time) and ﬁnal color, indicating the slot on
which the ball landed in the last throw(s) (red vs. black). The
third variable was gambling status (PGs vs. N-PGs). The
dependent variables (DVs) were the probability estimates of
both possible outcomes of the next ball throw (same-color
slot and opposite-color slot), the choice of the color on
which to bet, and the bet amount. The scores on impulsivity
and sensation seeking were included in the design as
covariates.
Participants
Three hundred twenty (160 PGs and 160 N-PGs) unpaid
male volunteers (N = 40 for each condition), living in
Campania (Italy) and aged between 18 and 68 years
(M = 34; SD = 10.451), participated in this study. PGs
were recruited in different Gambling Addiction Services
(GAS), i.e., psychiatric and psychological centers speciﬁ-
cally devoted to the diagnosis and treatment of gambling
addiction, with the collaboration of the health personnel.
The recruitment criteria were the following: diagnosis of
gambling addiction, absence of comorbidity with other
psychopathologies, and not yet having begun any treat-
ment. Since the percentage of women among PGs asking
for assistance was very low (below 3%), we decided to
recruit only males, in line with some previous studies
(e.g., Donati et al., 2018; Mathieu et al., 2018; Ricijas,
Hundric, & Huic, 2016).
N-PGs were recruited by means of posters placed in the
same GAS or in local shops and health and ﬁtness centers.
The two groups were matched in age and education, the
only personal information required. The South Oaks Gam-
bling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 1987; Italian
version: Guerreschi & Gander, 2000) was used as an
additional criterion to differentiate PGs and N-PGs, with
the aim of rejecting participants having high SOGS scores
from the N-PG group. In accordance with the literature
(Capitanucci & Carlevaro, 2004; Guerreschi & Gander,
2000, who report personal communication from H.
Lesieur), a cut-off of 2 was used. More precisely, of
160 N-PGs, 102 (63.8%) scored 0, 42 (26.3%) scored 1,
and 16 (10%) scored 2. The main gambling activities
performed more than once a week by PGs were sports
betting (53%), slot machines and video lottery terminals
(VLTs; 26%), cards games for money (11%), and lotteries
(10%), whereas bingo (4%), casino (4%), and horse racing
(3%) were less frequent activities. The gambling activities
performed more than once a week by N-PGs were: sports
betting (15.7%), and cards, slot machines, and VLTs, each
of them with a percentage of 1.3%. However, the majority
of N-PGs simply did not gamble. This information was
acquired through the ﬁrst item of the SOGS, as the GAS
cannot provide it to respect client privacy. A ﬁnancial
incentive was deliberately excluded for ethical and theo-
retical reasons. No GAS would give consent to use money
with PGs. Moreover, although the use of a monetary
incentive is widely diffused in the literature on decision-
making, and more generally in the literature employing
decision tasks (see, e.g., Ayton & Fischer, 2004;
Marmurek et al., 2015; Studer et al., 2015), some
works in the ﬁeld of cognitive economics or psychology
(e.g., Kühberger, 2001; Read, 2005) point out that the
presence of economic incentives is not necessary and may
even be detrimental to evaluate how people behave in
hypothetical contexts. Furthermore, some studies with PGs
(e.g., Linnet et al., 2012), although compensating partici-
pants for their time, did not allow them to wager money.
Finally, other studies (e.g., Clark et al., 2014) do not
mention any monetary payment.
All participants took part in two other studies in addition
to the present one. The order of the studies was counter-
balanced across subjects. All participants completed all
three studies.
Determination of sample size
To estimate the sample size necessary to test the hypotheses
of this study, we conducted an a priori power analysis for
ANCOVA to be performed on probability estimates of both
possible roulette outcomes using G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007). We chose to detect a medium effect
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size (f= 0.25) and to achieve a power (1− β) of 0.98 with α
error probability of 0.01. On request of a reviewer, we specify
that the choice of a medium effect size was based on the
results of previous related research, i.e. the experimental or
behavioral studies which had investigated the gambler’s
fallacy in PGs and N-PGs (Dixon et al., 2014; Gaissmaier
et al., 2016; Marmurek et al., 2015) and those investigating
the GF in N-PGs and reporting the effect size values from
which to compute Cohen’s f (e.g., Boynton, 2003; Matarazzo
et al., 2017; Studer et al., 2015). Since most of these studies
had a large or medium effect size and only one study had a
small effect size (f= 0.16), we chose a medium effect size. In
conformity with the selected parameters, we would have
needed 347 total participants.
However, due to GAS availability and time restrictions,
we were only able to collect data from 160 PGs. Conse-
quently, to equalize the size of the two groups, we recruited
the same number of N-PGs. Thus, our total sample was of
320 participants. Once we had collected the data, we
performed some post-hoc power analyses to check whether
the real sample size was compatible with an adequate
statistical power to reject a false null hypothesis (Faul
et al., 2007). For the ANCOVA, using the sample size of
320 participants, the same effect size parameter (f= 0.25)
and the same α level (f= 0.01) as in the a priori analysis, the
statistical power was 0.969. For the moderated mediation
analysis on bet, using the same sample size and α level, and
an a priori medium population effect size (f 2= 0.15), the
statistical power was 0.994. Thus, this study had high
statistical power (Cohen, 1988).
Given that the term “post hoc power analysis” is poten-
tially misleading (e.g., Faul et al., 2007; O’Keefe, 2007)
because it can be confused with “observed power” or
“retrospective power” analysis, with which it is often used
interchangeably, is noteworthy to point out the following
clariﬁcations. The post-hoc power analyses (Cohen, 1988),
“like a priori analyses, require an H1 effect size speciﬁca-
tion for the underlying population” (Faul et al., 2007,
p. 176), i.e., an effect size estimated before conducting the
study, whereas in the retrospective power analyses “the
effect size is estimated from sample data and used to
calculate the observed power, a sample estimate of the true
power” (Ibid). For this reason, the use of the retrospective
power analysis to estimate the statistical power of a study
(i.e., the probability that the null hypothesis is rejected,
given it is false) is largely criticized (e.g., Faul et al., 2007;
Hoenig & Heisey, 2001; O’Keefe, 2007).
Measures
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS – Lesieur & Blume,
1987; Italian version: Guerreschi & Gander, 2000). This is
a self-report questionnaire comprising 20 questions, which
allows one to detect possible gambling problems and to
learn some aspects of gamblers’ behavior, such as preferred
games and their frequency, problematic behavior related to
gambling (e.g., chasing, lies, and loss of control), practical
consequences of gambling, etc. Scores of 3 or 4 indicate the
presence of problem gambling, whereas scores of 5 or more
suggest the presence of pathological gambling. Scores
below 3 indicate non-problematic gambling.
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11 (BIS-11 – Patton,
Stanford, & Barratt, 1995; Italian version: Fossati, Di
Ceglie, Acquarini, & Barratt, 2001). This is a scale evalu-
ating the tendency to impulsivity in three areas: motor
impulsivity, impulsivity without planning, and cognitive
impulsivity. It consists of 30 items rated on a 4-point Likert
scale (ranging from 1= never/rarely to 4= almost always/
always); the total scores range from 30 to 120.
Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (BSSS; Hoyle, Fejfar, &
Miller, 2000; Italian version: Primi, Narducci, Benedetti,
Donati, & Chiesi, 2011). This scale was developed by
selecting eight items from the original Sensation Seeking
Scale Form V scale of Zuckerman, Kolin, Price, and Zoob
(1964), who conceptualized sensation seeking as the search
for intense, complex, new and varied experiences and
sensations as well as the willingness to assume ﬁnancial,
legal, social, and physical risks for such experiences. The
BSSS is a one-dimensional scale consisting of eight items
rated on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from 1= completely
disagree to 5= totally in agreement); the total scores range
from 8 to 40.
Pilot study
Before conducting the present experiment, a pilot study with
20 PGs (recruited in betting centers and scoring 5 or more on
the SOGS) and 20 N-PGs (recruited in pubs or bars and
scoring up to 2 on the SOGS) was carried out to ascertain the
effectiveness of the experimental procedure in inducing the
GF. The results showed that the procedure was effective and
that the participants believed they were playing a real
computerized roulette game.
Materials and procedure
The study was implemented with the online survey tool
Survey Monkey (which allowed to support a Graphics
Interchange Format image of a rotating roulette wheel with
a ball on the inside ball track), but was performed ofﬂine and
individually, in appropriate rooms provided by the GAS for
all participants. The general instructions informed partici-
pants that they would observe some rounds in a computer-
ized roulette game. The roulette wheel was created ad
hoc with only two colors: red and black. For each round,
the screen displayed a rotating roulette wheel, followed by
the outcome: “The ball landed on a red (or black) slot.”
Figure 1 shows an example of a round. Four experimental
conditions were obtained by crossing the run length (once or
the same outcome four times) with the color of the last
displayed outcome (red or black). Two conditions were
supposed to induce GF, whereas the other two worked as
control conditions. The GF-inducing sequences displayed
the same outcome for the last four rounds, with the ball
landing on a red or black slot four consecutive times.
Control sequences ended with one red or black outcome,
different with the color displayed in the previous round. All
sequences were constructed in such a way to seem repre-
sentative of randomly generated sequences. They are
reported in Figure 2. Note that building two different
sequences based on color aimed to disentangle a potential
color preference from GF.
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After 12 rounds, participants were informed that they had
20 tokens to bet on the next round. Before betting, they had
to indicate the probability of the ball landing on a red slot
and that of the ball landing on a black slot, on a scale from 1
to 100. The order of the two questions was counterbalanced
across participants (Figure 3). Later, participants had to
choose the slot color on which to bet and indicate the bet
amount, from 1 to 10 tokens.
It may be worth specifying that the procedure of asking
all participants to estimate the outcomes’ probability before
the bet choice without counterbalancing the questions’ order
was justiﬁed by the results of a previous study (Matarazzo
et al., 2017). In this article, we conducted two experiments,
in the ﬁrst of which choice preceded probability estimates,
whereas in the second, the questions’ order was inverted.
The results were analogous in both studies. Therefore, in
this study, we decided to use only one procedure, i.e., the
one in which the probability estimates preceded the choice,
to avoid too many variables in the design.
It should also be noted that requiring the probability
estimates of both outcomes was intended to prevent parti-
cipants focusing only on one outcome and to examine
whether they interpreted the two probabilities as indepen-
dent or complementary. In the latter case, their sum would
be 1, in the former, it would not.
Figure 1. Example of a round. This consisted of two screens: the ﬁrst one displayed a graphics interchange format of a rotating roulette wheel;
the second one displayed one of the two possible outcomes of the throw
Figure 2. Sequences of the 12 outcomes as a function of study
conditions (B: black; R: red)
Figure 3. Screens displaying the probability questions. Their order of appearance was counterbalanced
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At the end of the experimental sessions (i.e., at the end of
the three studies in which they took part), participants were
administered the BIS-11 (Patton et al., 1995; Italian adapta-
tion: Fossati et al., 2001) and the BSSS (Hoyle et al., 2000;
Italian adaptation: Primi et al., 2011) in a counterbalanced
order. Afterward, they completed the SOGS. Finally, they
were debriefed and thanked for their participation. The post-
experimental questions conﬁrmed that participants did not
suspect that the roulette sequences had been manipulated.
Statistical analyses
All data analyses were conducted using SPSS 18.0 IBM
software (Armonk, NY, USA). All variables were initially
screened for missing data, distribution abnormalities, and
outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). To ascertain whether
participants in the eight conditions differed in terms of age
and education, two ANOVAs were performed. To examine
whether participants differed on the two personality scales,
the BSSS and BIS-11, a MANOVA was conducted.
To test the hypotheses underlying this study, we ﬁrst
performed a 2 × 2 × 2 between-subject ANCOVA to inves-
tigate whether the independent variables (IVs), run length
(4 times vs.1 time with the same ﬁnal color), ﬁnal color (red
vs. black), and gambling status (N-PGs vs. PGs) affected,
singularly or in interaction, the probability estimate of each
of the next two outcomes. The scores on BIS-11 and BSSS
and their interaction with gambling status were included as
covariates. Since probability estimate was a repeated mea-
sure, we calculated a unique variable, delta (Δ) probability,
by subtracting the red probability values from the black ones
(Montoya & Hayes, 2017).
Then, two moderated mediation analyses were con-
ducted. Note that such type of analysis (Hayes, 2018;
Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005) examines whether the
putative effect of the IV on the DV is exerted through
intervening variable(s) – Mediator(s) – and whether such a
mediated effect differs as a function of the values of other
variable(s) included in the design – Moderator(s) – which
are supposed to affect the relationship between IV, Media-
tor(s), and DV.
The ﬁrst moderated mediation analysis examined whether
the putative effect of run length on the choice of the outcome
on which to bet was mediated by Δ probability and moder-
ated by ﬁnal color and gambling status. The second exam-
ined the same putative effects on bet amount, adding the
interaction between probability estimate and choice as a
second mediator. In both analyses, BSSS and BIS-11 scores
and their interactions with gambling status were included in
the models as covariates. To diminish multicollinearity with
the interaction terms, the two continuous variables were
centered by subtracting the mean value of each variable from
each individual score (Aiken &West, 1991). Both moderated
mediation analyses were conducted using the PROCESS
macro for SPSS 3.1 (Hayes, 2018), which allows 92 different
models of moderation, mediation, and moderated mediation
analyses to be tested. To estimate conditional indirect
effects – i.e., the effects of IV on DV through mediating
variables at different values of moderators – the macro
adopts the bootstrapping method: 5,000 bootstrap samples
were used to calculate bias-corrected conﬁdence intervals
(at a 95% conﬁdence level).
The moderated mediation analysis on the choice of the
outcome to bet on was performed using model 63 of the
PROCESS macro (see Figure 4a). The IV, run length, and
the two moderators (Mods), ﬁnal color and gambling status,
were coded as dummy variables (run length: 1= 4 times the
same ﬁnal color, 0= 1 time; ﬁnal color: 1= black, 0= red;
gambling status: 1= PGs, 0=N-PGs). Also the DV, choice
of the color on which to bet, was coded as a dummy variable
(1= opposite to the ﬁnal color, henceforth alternation
choice, 0= same as the ﬁnal color).
In this model, run length was supposed to affect, singu-
larly or in interaction with gambling status, both the medi-
ator (Δ probability) and the DV (alternation choice), while
ﬁnal color was supposed to moderate the relationships
between IV and mediator, IV and DV, and mediator and
DV. Concerning the latter, alternation choice should in-
crease as a direct function of Δ probability (black probabil-
ities minus red probabilities) when ﬁnal color was red,
whereas the opposite effect should occur when ﬁnal color
was black: in this case, the decrease of Δ probability should
increase alternation choice.
The second moderated mediation analysis was performed
on bet amount, again using model 63. The tested effects
were the same as in the previous analysis, but the interaction
between Δ probability and alternation choice was added as
a second mediator (Figure 4b).
Finally, to investigate whether participants interpreted
black and red probabilities as complementary with or inde-
pendent from each other, three χ2 tests were conducted on the
following variables: (a) frequency of cases whose sum as a
percentage was 100 (i.e., the two probabilities were per-
ceived as complementary); (b) frequency of cases where each
of the two probabilities was 50 (the correct probabilities, a
sub-category of the previous group); and (c) frequency of
cases whose sum went over or under 100 (the two probabili-
ties were perceived as independent from each other).
To examine the “extent to which a ﬁnding is reliant on
the presence of a covariate” (Simmons, Nelson, &
Simonsohn, 2011, p. 1363), all statistical analyses were
conducted also without the covariates.
Ethics
The study procedures were carried out in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki. The study was approved by the
Ethical Committee of the Department of Psychology of the
University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli.” All participants
were informed about the study and all provided informed
consent before and after the experimental session.
RESULTS
No missing data or outliers (detected through the Mahala-
nobis distance) were found in the data.
In Table 1, the distributions of education, age, BSSS, and
BIS-11 scores as a function of the study conditions are
reported.
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The two ANOVAs showed that participants did not differ
in age and education (all ps ns).
The MANOVA showed that PGs scored higher than
N-PGs in the BSSS, F1,312= 28.62, p< .001, ηp2= 0.084,
and in the BIS-11, F1,312= 90.26, p< .001, ηp2= 0.224.
In Table 2, the means and standard deviations of the
participants’ responses to the DVs – the probability estimate
of each of the next two outcomes, the choice of the color on
which to bet, and the bet amount – are shown as a function
of the IVs. Moreover, the Δ probability variable, obtained
by subtracting the red probability values from the black
ones, is also reported: when the value of delta is positive,
black probabilities are higher than red probabilities; when
the value of delta is negative, red probabilities are higher
than black probabilities.
The results of the ANCOVA performed on Δ probability
(Table 3) revealed two main effects, ﬁnal color and gam-
bling status as well as three 2-way interaction effects: run
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of age, educational level, as well as BSSS and BIS scores of participants as a function of the study conditions
Study conditions
4-Red 4-Black 1-Red 1-Black
N-PGs PGs N-PGs PGs N-PGs PGs N-PGs PGs
Age [mean (SD)] 33.4 (10.0) 34.5 (10.0) 32 (10.3) 33.8 (11.8) 35.8 (11.0) 35.6 (11.0) 34 (9.4) 33.8 (11.8)
Educational level (%) – Years of study
Up to 8 46.2 53.8 54.5 45.5 62.5 37.5 50.0 50.0
Up to 13 49.2 50.8 47.5 52.5 49.3 50.7 49.2 50.8
Up to 18 62.5 37.5 62.5 37.5 0 100 57.1 42.9
Brief Sensation Seeking
Scale [mean (SD)]
21.1 (5.7) 23.5 (6.1) 20.5 (5.3) 23.4 (5.5) 18.8 (6.0) 22.7 (5.1) 19.2 (5.0) 23.3 (5.4)
Barrett Impulsiveness
Scale [mean (SD)]
52.3 (9.4) 61.2 (10.3) 50.9 (8.9) 65.4 (12.3) 49.9 (9.1) 57.1 (10.3) 49 (7.5) 58.1 (7.1)
Note. N-PGs: non-problem gamblers; PGs: problem gamblers; BSSS: Brief Sensation Seeking Scale; BIS: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11;
SD: standard deviation; 4-Red: run ending with 4 red slots; 4-Black: run ending with 4 black slots; 1-Red: run ending with 1 red slot; 1-Black:
run ending with 1 black slot.
Figure 4. Diagrams of the tested models using the Macro PROCESS 3.1: (a) Moderated mediation analysis (Model 63) performed on the
alternation choice. Run length: independent variable (IV); Gambling status: Moderator (Mod); Final color: Moderator (Mod); Δ probability:
Mediator; Alternation choice: dependent variable. (b) Moderated mediation analysis (Model 63) performed on the bet amount. Run length:
independent variable (IV); Gambling status: Moderator (Mod); Final color: Moderator (Mod); Δ probability: Mediator 1;
Δ probability × alternation choice=Mediator 2; Bet amount= dependent variable
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length × ﬁnal color, ﬁnal color × gambling status, and
BSSS × gambling status. Δ probability (black probability−
red probability) increased when ﬁnal color was red, and it
was higher in N-PGs than in PGs. These effects were
qualiﬁed by the run length × ﬁnal color and gambling
status × ﬁnal color interactions, which were examined
through a simple effect analysis. Concerning the ﬁrst inter-
action, pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment
revealed that when run length was 1 (i.e., the ﬁnal color of
the sequence occurred only 1 time), Δ probability did not
signiﬁcantly differ as a function of the ﬁnal color, whereas
when run length was 4 (i.e. the ﬁnal color of the sequence
occurred 4 times),Δ probabilitywas higher when ﬁnal color
was red rather than black (see Figure 5, Graph 1a). With
regard to the second interaction, in N-PGs, there was no
signiﬁcant difference in Δ probability as a function of the
ﬁnal color, because black probability was always higher
than red probability (Δ probability always had a positive
value); instead, in PGs, Δ probability decreased (meaning
that red probability was higher than the black one) when the
ﬁnal color was black rather than red (see Figure 5, Graph
1b). The BSSS × gambling status interaction, examined
through parameter estimates, revealed that in PGs the
increase in BSSS scores entailed an increase in Δ probabil-
ity, whereas no signiﬁcant change was produced in the
N-PG group.
The moderated mediation analysis on choice ﬁrst tested
the effect of the IV variables and covariates on the mediator,
Δ probability, whose results have been already described in
reporting the ANCOVA’s ﬁndings. WhenΔ probabilitywas
added to previous variables in the logistic regression equa-
tion to examine their effect on alternation choice, the results
(Table 4) showed that alternation choice was predicted by
ﬁnal color, run length, Δ probability, run length × ﬁnal
color interaction, andΔ probability × ﬁnal color interaction.
With reference to the intercept, the probability of alternation
choice was higher for black (coded as 1) than for red (coded
as 0) as the ﬁnal color for the one-ending sequences, coded
as 0 in the dummy variable run length (ﬁnal color effect).
Such a probability increased with four-ending sequences
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of probability estimates, choice of the color on which to bet, and bet amount as a function of the
study conditions
Study conditions
4-Red 4-Black 1-Red 1-Black
N-PGs PGs N-PGs PGs N-PGs PGs N-PGs PGs
Probability estimates [mean (SD)]
Red 47.9 (13.7) 43.5 (16.8) 47.7 (8.9) 51.8 (15.2) 48.6 (4.7) 50.7 (4.7) 47.4 (8.5) 48.9 (9.6)
Black 54.7 (11.2) 52.4 (20.5) 52.2 (8.7) 42.8 (11.2) 51.1 (4.8) 49.1 (3.1) 50.2 (12.0) 47.1 (10.5)
Δ probability (Black prob. –
Red prob.)
6.75 (22.9) 8.95 (28.7) 4.53 (17.2) −9.0 (16.9) 2.52 (9.3) −1.60 (7.3) 2.82 (17.6) −1.88 (17.2)
Choice of the color on which to bet (%)
Same as the ﬁnal color 37.5 37.5 35 30 57.5 67.5 30 27.5
Opposite to the ﬁnal color
(alternation choice)
62.5 62.5 65 70 42.5 32.5 70 72.5
Bet amount (from 0 up to
10 tokens) [mean (SD)]
5.0 (1.6) 6.5 (2.4) 4.9 (2.1) 5.4 (2.3) 5.1 (2.1) 6.3 (1.7) 4.7 (2.0) 6.3 (1.8)
Note. N-PGs: non-problem gamblers; PGs: problem gamblers; SD: standard deviation; 4-Red: run ending with 4 red slots; 4-Black: run
ending with 4 black slots; 1-Red: run ending with 1 red slot; 1-Black: run ending with 1 black slot.
Table 3. Results of the ANCOVA performed on Δ probability (Black prob. – Red prob.)
df F p Partial η2
Corrected model 11 3.581 .000 0.113
Intercept 1 0.223 .637 0.001
BIS 11 1 0.124 .725 0.000
BSSS 1 0.199 .656 0.001
Gambling status 1 10.073 .002 0.032
Final color 1 7.027 .008 0.022
Run length 1 0.618 .432 0.002
BIS 11 × gambling status 1 0.405 .525 0.001
BSSS × gambling status 1 5.304 .022 0.017
Final color × gambling status 1 4.874 .028 0.016
Run length × gambling status 1 0.460 .498 0.001
Run length × ﬁnal color 1 6.341 .012 0.020
Run length × ﬁnal color × gambling status 1 3.511 .062 0.011
Error 308
Note. BSSS: Brief Sensation Seeking Scale; BIS: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11; ANCOVA: analysis of covariance.
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compared to one-ending sequences when the ﬁnal color was
red (run length effect), whereas it was high and only slightly
decreased when the ﬁnal color was black (negative effect of
run length × ﬁnal color interaction; Figure 5, Graph 2). An
increase of Δ probability produced an increase of the
probability of alternation choice when the ﬁnal color was
Figure 5. Interaction effects from statistical analyses. Graphs 1a and 1b – Interaction effects from ANCOVA on Δ probability: run
length × ﬁnal color (Graph 1a) and ﬁnal color × gambling status (Graph 1b). Graph 2 and 3 – Interaction effects from moderated mediation
analysis on choice of the color on which to bet: run length × ﬁnal color (Graph 2) and Δ probability × ﬁnal color (Graph 3). Graph 4 –
Interaction effect from moderated mediation analysis on Bet amount: Δ probability × choice × ﬁnal color. Means are estimated as a function
of the covariates
762 | Journal of Behavioral Addictions 8(4), pp. 754–769 (2019)
Matarazzo et al.
red (Δ probability effect), whereas it produced a decrease
when the ﬁnal color was black (Δ probability × ﬁnal color
interaction effect; Figure 5, Graph 3).
The conditional direct effect of run length on the proba-
bility of alternation choice, which was moderated by ﬁnal
color, was the same for both PGs and N-PGs. Instead, the
conditional indirect effect of run length through Δ proba-
bility was moderated not only by ﬁnal color but also by
gambling status: it was signiﬁcant only for the red color and
the N-PG group (Table 4). Thus, in N-PGs, when run length
ended with 4 red, Δ probability increased, and such an
increase produced an increase in alternation choice.
The results of the moderated mediation analysis on bet
amount (Table 5) revealed that bet amount was predicted
by gambling status, Δ probability, Δ probability × alterna-
tion choice, and Δ probability × alternation choice × ﬁnal
color interactions. PGs bet more than N-PGs. When Δ
probability increased, bet amount decreased with the
choice of betting on the same color as the ﬁnal one (Δ
probability effect) and increased with alternation choice (Δ
probability × alternation choice effect). This effect was
further moderated by the ﬁnal color: when it was red, the
alternation choice produced an increase in the bet amount
as a function of the increase of Δ probability, whereas the
choice of betting on the same outcome produced the
opposite effect; when ﬁnal color was black, both types of
choice produced a decrease in the bet amount with an
increase of Δ probability (Figure 5, Graph 4). Run length
exerted conditional indirect effects on bet amount through
both mediators: Δ probability and Δ probability × choice.
The ﬁrst indirect effect was moderated by ﬁnal color and
gambling status, being signiﬁcant only with N-PGs and
when ﬁnal color was red. The second one was moderated
only by ﬁnal color and was signiﬁcant in both groups when
ﬁnal color was red.
All analyses, performed without covariates, gave analo-
gous results.
Finally, the three χ2 tests performed on the participants’
conception of the two probabilities, crossing the four
manipulated conditions with gambling status, revealed no
signiﬁcant effects of the study conditions (all ps ns). It is
noteworthy that 263 of the 320 participants (82.18%)
considered the two probabilities as complementary (and
173, i.e., 54%, evaluated them correctly), while the
remaining 57 (17.81%) considered the two probabilities
as reciprocally independent.
Table 4. Results of the moderated mediation analysis (Model 63 – see Figure 4a) testing the effects of run length (IV),
Δ probability (mediator), ﬁnal color and gambling status (moderators), BSSS, BIS-11, BSSS × gambling status, and BIS-11 × gambling
status (covariates) on alternation choice
Logistic regression summary −2 LL Model LL p Cox–Snell Nagelkerke
357.1832 74.3422 <.001 0.2073 0.2800
Model B z p CI
Constant −0.5034 −1.5491 .1214 [−1.1404, 0.1335]
Δ Probability 0.0571 3.6187 .0003 [0.0262, 0.0880]
Run length 0.8928 2.0061 .0448 [0.0205, 1.7651]
Δ Probability × ﬁnal color −0.1216 −5.5521 .0000 [−0.1645, −0.0787]
Final color 1.6794 4.5850 .0000 [0.9615, 2.3974]
Run length × ﬁnal color −1.1975 −2.3038 .0212 [−2.2164, −0.1787]
Gambling status −0.0625 −0.1606 .8724 [−0.8249, 0.6999]
Run length × gambling status 0.0257 0.0481 .9616 [−1.0205, 1.0719]
BSSS −0.1030 −0.3027 .7621 [−0.0773, 0.0566]
BIS-11 0.0007 0.0327 .9739 [−0.0408, 0.0422]
BSSS × gambling status −0.0156 −0.3278 .7431 [−0.1091, 0.0778]
BIS-11 × gambling status −0.0196 −0.6978 .4853 [−0.0745, 0.454]
Conditional direct effect of run length on alternation choice at values of the moderator(s)
Final color Gambling status Effect p CI
Red Non-problem gamblers .8928 .0457 [0.0205, 1.7651]
Red Problem gamblers .9185 .0391 [0.0496, 1.7875]
Black Non-problem gamblers −.3047 .5074 [−1.2056, 0.5962]
Black Problem gamblers −.2790 .5634 [−1.2255, 0.6674]
Conditional indirect effect(s) of run length through Δ probability (mediator) on alternation choice at values of moderator(s)
Final color Gambling status Effect CI
Red Non-problem gamblers 0.4673 [0.0488, 1.3982]
Red Problem gamblers 0.3175 [−0.0674, 1.1556]
Black Non-problem gamblers 0.1270 [−0.3476, 0.6961]
Black Problem gamblers 0.2962 [−0.1681, 0.8525]
Note. BSSS: Brief Sensation Seeking Scale; BIS: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11; CI: conﬁdence interval; LL: log likelihood.
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DISCUSSION
This study investigated the GF in two groups of N-PGs and
PGs by means of a computerized behavioral task mimick-
ing a roulette game. Speciﬁcally, it was examined whether
a run of four identical outcomes in the roulette wheel
induced the choice of betting on the opposite outcome,
and whether such a choice was based on an overestimation
of its probability. In addition, we investigated whether the
GF was associated with an increase in the bet amount.
Moreover, it was questioned whether PGs were more prone
than N-PGs to incurring the GF. In this way, we tested the
largely shared assumption that cognitive distortions under-
lie the maintenance of PG by focusing on the GF, one of
the most widespread distortions and most consistently
associated with problem gambling (Goodie & Fortune,
2013). Finally, we examined the role of impulsivity and
sensation seeking in proneness to GF.
Two indices of GF were used: a cognitive index, the
probability estimate of each roulette spin’s possible out-
comes, and a behavioral index, namely the choice of the
outcome on which to bet. Such a procedure allowed us to
distinguish whether choosing the outcome on which to bet
was based on an overestimation of its probability, according
to the cognitive explanation of the GF, or was inﬂuenced by
a preference for one outcome rather than another.
Our results partially support the tested hypotheses. Re-
garding the cognitive index of the GF, even if Δ probability
tended to increase (meaning that black probability was higher
than red probability) when ﬁnal color was red, the interaction
between run length and ﬁnal color went in the predicted
direction. Indeed, four-ending sequences elicited an increase
ofΔ probabilitywhen ﬁnal colorwas red and a decrease until
a negative value (meaning that red probability was higher
than black probability) when ﬁnal color was black, in
conformity with the assumed overestimation of the opposite
outcome probability in the GF. However, no three-way
interaction between run length, ﬁnal color, and gambling
statuswas found. The difference between PGs and N-PGs did
not concern the magnitude of the overestimation effect, but
rather it concerned the groups’ bias toward the ﬁnal color.
Indeed, while N-PGs tended to overestimate black probability
irrespective of the color with which the sequences ended,
P-Gs tended to overestimate black probability when the ﬁnal
color was red and underestimate it when the ﬁnal color was
black, irrespective of run length.
Table 5. Results of the moderated mediation analysis (Model 63 – see Figure 4b) testing the effects of Run length (I.V.), Δ probability,
Δ probability × alternation choice (mediators), ﬁnal color and gambling status (moderators), BSSS, BIS-11, BSSS × gambling status,
BIS-11 × gambling status (covariates) on bet amount
Model summary R2 F p
.1513 4.196 <.001
Model B t p CI
Constant 5.1396 16.9242 .0000 [4.5420, 5.7371]
Δ Probability −0.0532 −2.1746 .0304 [−0.1014, −0.0051]
Δ Probability × alternation choice 0.0841 3.1342 .0019 [0.0313, 0.1370]
Run length −0.1889 −.4603 .6456 [−0.9963, 0.6185]
Δ Probability × ﬁnal color 0.0411 −1.4346 .1524 [−0.0153, 0.0975]
Δ Probability × alternation choice × ﬁnal color −0.0855 −2.5554 .0111 [−0.1513, −0.0197]
Final color −0.1155 −0.3530 .7243 [−0.7593, 0.5283]
Run length × ﬁnal color −0.0221 −0.0474 .9622 [−0.9380, 0.8939]
Gambling status 1.2011 3.4459 .0006 [0.5152, 1.8870]
Run length × gambling status −0.3454 −0.7325 .4644 [−1.2731, 0.5824]
BSSS −0.0032 −0.1033 .9178 [−0.0635, 0.0571]
BIS-11 0.0272 1.4156 .1579 [−0.0106, 0.0650]
BSSS × gambling status 0.0465 1.0714 .2848 [−0.0389, 0.1320]
BIS-11 × gambling status −0.0382 −1.5006 .1345 [−0.0882, 0.0119]
Conditional indirect effect of run length on bet amount through Δ probability and Δ probability × alternation choice (mediators) and at
values of the moderator(s)
Mediator Final color Gambling status Effect CI
Δ Probability Red Non-problem gamblers −0.4360 [−1.0458, −0.0243]
Δ Probability Red Problem gamblers −0.2963 [−0.8120, 0.0699]
Δ Probability Black Non-problem gamblers 0.0239 [−0.0845, 0.2615]
Δ Probability Black Problem gamblers 0.0558 [−0.0930, 0.3189]
Δ Probability × alternation choice Red Non-problem gamblers 0.8421 [0.2492, 1.5980]
Δ Probability × alternation choice Red Problem gamblers 0.5578 [0.0211, 1.2823]
Δ Probability × alternation choice Black Non-problem gamblers 0.0015 [−0.1339, 0.1277]
Δ Probability × alternation choice Black Problem gamblers 0.0060 [−0.2709, 0.2499]
Note. For lack of space, the conditional direct effects of run length at values of the moderators are not reported because all were not
signiﬁcant. CI: conﬁdence interval.
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Regarding the behavioral index of the GF, i.e., the
alternation choice, the results were again quite complex.
In both PG and N-PG groups, the probability of the alter-
nation choice increased with four-ending sequences com-
pared to one-ending sequences, but only when the ﬁnal color
was red. When it was black, such a probability was always
high. The increase of the difference between black and red
probability estimates (Δ probability) produced an increase
in the probability of the alternation choice when the ﬁnal
color was red, and a decrease when the ﬁnal color was black,
in line with the GF. However, it was only for N-PGs that Δ
probability mediated the effect of run length on choice in
interaction with the color red. For PGs, the effect of
moderated mediation was not signiﬁcant.
These ﬁndings suggest that estimating the probability of
next outcomes and choosing the outcome on which to bet
are two intertwined, although non-consequential, processes.
Moreover, they somewhat differ between PGs and N-PGs.
The ﬁrst process was consistent with the supposed tendency
to equalize unbalanced sequences of events, as postulated by
the classical explanation of the GF (Kahneman & Tversky,
1972; Rabin, 2002; Wagenaar, 1972). Conversely, the
choice of the color on which to bet was mainly driven by
the preference for the color red rather than black, i.e., by an
affective criterion (Zajonc, 1980). However, when a cogni-
tive factor, i.e., the unbelievability of a long series with the
same outcome interferes with and overcomes the affective
criterion, the default choice is reversed. For the sequences
ending with black slot(s), affective and cognitive criteria go
in the same direction; thus, no evidence for the cognitive
mediation of the probability estimate has been found. Such
results mirror those of Matarazzo et al. (2017), in which
participants (N-PGs) always preferred to bet on high cards
rather than on low ones in a card-guessing game, although
they reversed their choice, in line with the GF, when the
series ended with four high cards [In our previous article
(Matarazzo et al., 2017), we speculated that the preference
for high cards could depend on the “high is better than low”
heuristic. The preference for the red color found in this study
could be due to the fact that in the Neapolitan (and more
generally in the South Italian) tradition, red is often the color
of good luck or apotropaic objects]. Concerning this study, it
should be emphasized that the affective and cognitive
criteria on which decision-making is based have been
brought to light thanks to methodological choices to manip-
ulate both run length and ﬁnal color and to use both a
cognitive and a behavioral index for GF. Such choices have
also allowed us to show that, in decision-making, cognitive
distortion prevailed over preference when the two criteria
went in opposite directions. Indeed, the mediation effect of
probability overestimation was signiﬁcant only when the
ﬁnal color was red, i.e., only when cognition-based choice
was in contrast with preference-based choice. Nevertheless,
this moderated mediation effect emerged only in N-PGs.
Although both groups made analogous choices, PGs were
less likely than N-PGs to base their decision on this cogni-
tive bias. However, PGs were more inﬂuenced than N-PGs
by the ﬁnal color when estimating the probability of each of
the next two possible outcomes.
With regard to the link between the GF and the bet
amount, our results corroborate the model we have tested,
according to which the overestimation of the probability of
an alternation outcome and the choice to bet on it increased
the bet amount. As expected, we found that Δ probability
mediated the effect of run length on the bet amount through
the interaction with alternation choice and ﬁnal color. This
effect was analogous for both PGs and N-PGs. Unsurpris-
ingly, PGs bet more than N-PGs. However, this result does
not depend on a higher proneness of PGs to GF. Nor does it
depend on the higher levels of impulsivity and sensation
seeking that PGs have shown compared to N-PGs. Indeed,
these variables scarcely affected the results. The only effect
we found was the increase of Δ probability as a function of
the increase of sensation-seeking scores in the PG group. No
effects were found either on choice or on the bet amount.
Note that the ﬁnding that PGs bet more than N-PGs seems
to support the idea that one can avoid using real money to
evaluate how people behave in hypothetical contexts
(Kühberger, 2001; Read, 2005).
Finally, although the majority of the participants correctly
estimated the probability of red and black outcomes, or at
least viewed them as complementary, some of them (17.81%)
considered the two probabilities as reciprocally independent,
regardless of experimental conditions and gambling status.
Overall, our ﬁndings are in contrast with prior research
(see “Introduction” section) showing that cognitive distor-
tions, such as GF, impulsivity, and/or sensation seeking, are
powerful predictors of PG. However, as stressed above, the
large majority of these studies is correlational in nature
and/or use comprehensive measures of cognitive distortions.
Our results are similar to those of the only study (Marmurek
et al., 2015), which, to our knowledge, has experimentally
investigated the occurrence of the GF in PGs and N-PGs, and
which found no difference between the two groups.
They are also analogous to those of Lambos and
Delfabbro (2007), showing that pathological poker machine
players endorsed more irrational beliefs than regular and
infrequent players, but did not differ from the other groups
in understanding basic gambling odds.
Limitations and future direction
This study did not investigate other cognitive distortions and
only focused on the GF; thus, our results are restrained to this
speciﬁc fallacy. Moreover, it was based on a convenience
sample of PGs and N-PGs. As we speciﬁed in the “Partici-
pants” section, PGs were recruited from among those asking
for assistance from devoted clinical services of Campania
region (Southern Italy) and who have a gambling addiction
diagnosis from psychiatrists or clinical psychologists. Thus,
although our sample encompassed a large age range and all
instructional levels and although main gambling activities
were represented in it, the absence of probability sampling
obliges us to be particularly cautious in generalizing the
results of this study. However, our results extend those of
the few previous studies going in a similar direction (Lambos
& Delfabbro, 2007; Marmurek et al., 2015).
Even if further research, based on probability sampling
and both genders participants, is needed to corroborate these
results, at present, they suggest that caution should be taken
when assuming that a cognitive distortion such as the GF
fuels problem gambling.
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